ermouμην ξεχάσετε αύριο World Middle Finger DayMinulla on vain neljä (veri)sukulaista.mera one friend her what about TheerKielioppia nykynuorille: Substantiivi on se sana, jonka jälkeen voi lisätä "perkele", kuten äijänperkele, autonperkele. Adjektiivi on sana jonka eteen lisätään "paskan", kuten paskantärkee, paskanhailee. Verbi on sana, jonka jälkeen lisätään sanat "ihan sikana". Nyt voi pennunperkeleet päntätä ihan sikana paskanhaileeta kieliopinperkelettä. Yhdyssana on sellanen jonka väliin EI voi laittaa vittu. Niinku
yhdysvittusana. Ei käy. Kuormavittuauto. Ei käy. Aivan vitun ihana. Käy.
.onha italialaiset talot huoliteltui ei graffiteiOlen harmonia-addikti, kärsin riitelystä..rajhaa on enemmän kai onha ihan ohuet kujat kivojja niitä on ohuet kapetat kapeat.https://twitter.com/Laspogaridas/status/625987981325803520 https://twitter.com/pedioareos/status/625936959349911552 kesänalussa telttoja oli kuulemma satamatie täynnäunkifestivaali Kallio Block Party järjestetään Sörnäisissä Hämeentiellä lauantaina 1.8.2015. Hämeentie on suljettu ajoneuvoliikenteeltä välillä Haapaniemenkatu - Pääskylänkatu klo 09.00-24.00.
hejjjj!!pånen lähtö kohti kotisatamaa. Aamuhetki kullan kallis. #purjehdus #sailing #nps #sunrise #auringonnousu Mitä on rakkaus? Sehän
on aivan yksinkertaista!
Rakkautta on kaikki,
laajentaa, rikastuttaa menin hattuni alle lipotakti
ja lähdin maailmalle
pois köyhyyttä pakohon.
Tein tuulentuvan, tein talon,
sain lahjaksi päivän valon
Rakkaus on yhtä
kulkuneuvo.https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nRWweMDjnKo novote syntagma vähä vieo
Ongelmallisia ovat vain
kuljettaja, matkustajat ja tiet.
seksiä diaforopoihseis, on se aika kaukana etelässä euroopa. kirjaston kuistila oikeudet aurinkoa poistetuja kahveet, kaunis keli 20 ei luvassa kuuroohttps://instagram.com/p/5tbOwro8Pd/kymmene kl kilo näkyy ohikulkevissa ikkunois eise mit juhalihapihviDDR:n kulttuuritoimisto Helsingissä jakoi ulkomaalaisille opiskelijoille stipendejä mnä en voi auutta hän sanoi ja sitten kuitenkin auttnhalla koulukaverillani oli synttärit ja yllätimme hänet ravintolassa. Hän luuli menevänsä poikansa kanssa kahville, mutta sitten paikalla olikin enemmän porukkaa, yllätys osui nappiin.
Tapasin Ateneumissa uskollisen lukijani HK:n ja kävimme ihailemassa Järnefeltin taidetta, johon en koskaan kyllästy.ain vähän vitsaillen Eranti ehdottaa, että eurooppalaisen vasemmiston kannattaisi laittaa kaikki paukut Saksan seuraaviin vaaleihin.
– Jos Saksa kerran vetää euroa ja EU:ta, rationaalinen toimija päättää, että hoidetaan ensin vaalivoitto siellä ja katsotaan, mitä sen jälkeen tapahtuu.
LIVE Εκκενώνεται το μοναστήρι του Αγίου Ιωάννη Προδρόμου στον Καρέα - Συνεχής ενημέρωση:http://go.naft.gr/MszUzv #fire #Athens #GreeceHow the latest 'solution' to the debt crisis locks Europe into a grim next chapter
By JAMES K. GALBRAITH
The Greek Parliament has now voted to surrender control of the Greek state to platoons of bureaucrats from Brussels, Frankfurt and Berlin, who will now re-impose the full policy regime against which Greeks rebelled in January 2015 – and which they again rejected, by overwhelming majority, in the referendum of July 5.
The orders from Brussels will impose strict new rules on the Greek people in the supposed interest of paying down Greece's debt. In return, the Europeans and the IMF will put up enough new money so that they themselves can appear to be repaid on schedule–thus increasing Greece's debt–and the European Central Bank will continue to prop up the Greek banking system.
A hitch has already appeared in the plan: the International Monetary Fund, whose approval is required, has pointed out—correctly— that the Greek debt cannot be paid, and so the Fund cannot participate unless the debt is restructured. Now Germany, Greece’s main creditor, faces a new decision: either grant debt relief, or force Greece into formal default, which would cause the ECB to collapse Greece's banks and force the Greeks out of the Euro.
There are many ways to rewrite debt, and let's suppose the Germans find one they can live with. The question arises: What then?
An end to the immediate crisis is likely to have some good near-term effect. The Greek banks will “reopen,” likely on Monday, and the European Central Bank will raise the ceiling on the liquidity assistance on which they rely for survival. The ATMs will be filled, although limits on cash withdrawals and on electronic transfers out of the country will likely remain. There will be some talk of new public investment, funded by the European Union; perhaps some stalled road projects will restart.
With these measures, it is not impossible that the weeks ahead will see a small uptick of economic life, and certainly, any such will make big news. It's also possible that even without good news, Greece may limp along in stagnation, within the Euro.
But if you walk through the requirements of Greece's new program, there is another possibility. That possibility is an economic death spiral – contraction leading to banking failure, banking failure leading to contraction – first in Greece and, later on, elsewhere in Europe.
Here's what that would look like:
Value-added tax rates – your basic regressive sales tax – will jump by ten percentage points or more, to 23 percent, including for hotels and restaurants and including on the Greek islands. This will divert tourists to Turkey and elsewhere, damping Greece's largest industry. Also, it will drive small businesses even further to cash and tax evasion. This means other tax revenues will also fall.
Tax revenues will rise at first, but then they will fall short of targets, both because economic activity falls and evasion rises. As this happens, the new program requires that public spending be cut automatically. Since most public spending goes for pensions and wages, this means that pensions and wages will be cut. Since pensioners and civil servants live on these payments, they will cut their spending – and tax revenues will fall further.
In the labor market, extreme deregulation will proceed. Collective bargaining will be suppressed; wages will therefore fall. As a result, wage labor will go off-the-books, into cash, even more than it already has, and pension contributions will decline again. The resulting tax losses will feed back into pension cuts.
Privatization will work through a required new fund that will, supposedly, hold 50 billion euro in Greek assets to be sold off (notwithstanding the difficulty that, according to the Economy Minister, public assets on that scale do not exist). Anyhow the state electricity company will be sold, and electric rates will rise.
As all this happens, even more people will default on their mortgages. The judicial code will be rewritten to facilitate mass foreclosures, so far held in abeyance. The non-performing-loans of the banking system will then go from disastrous to catastrophic.
Now then, under these conditions, what do you think will happen to the banks?
It is possible that a surge of “confidence” will now bring cash deposits back to the banks, new inter-bank loans from North Europe, new lending to small businesses, new jobs and economic growth. Possible, but not likely.
Much more likely, with every increase of the ceiling on Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA), and every relaxation of capital controls, people in Greece will line up to pull cash from the banking system. They will do this because they have to, in order to live. They will do this because cash avoids taxes. They will do it because any fool can see that the banks are doomed. So deposits will go down, the ELA will go up, still more loans will go bad, and the banks will continue as zombies until – at some point – the European Central Bank gives up and closes them down, this time for good. Greek depositors will then lose what little remains.
Meanwhile, let's return to the legal status of the new economic program. It is true that the Greek parliament has approved it – as the Prime Minister said, with a “knife to the neck.” But it is a point of law that a contract signed under duress is not enforceable. This point will be heard soon, and clearly, in Greek politics if not in the courts.
It will resonate, also, through Greek society. The free consent of the governed is a right, which the Greek people have now been denied. They will not take it lightly; one can expect both passive and active resistance. Street conflict—not good for tourism—will become, once again, routine. As this happens, the drachma will become a symbol of national freedom.
Eventually, the Greek majority – the 62 percent who voted “No” on July 5 – will be heard from again. A government elected by that majority will not go back to negotiations. Instead, it will repeal the program, default on the debt, take the consequences and leave the euro.
So within a few months or years, what has just happened will be overturned and repudiated. And if the Greek banks have not failed yet, they will then. At that point, Greece will be poorer than it is, even now—but it will again be independent.
But wait. The death spiral dynamic isn't necessarily limited to Greece. It could start to happen in Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and perhaps Italy – beginning, as it did in Greece, with a fall-off in inter-bank loans from Northern Europe. Bankers, it turns out, are often the first to start a run on other banks.
What the Greek government tried to do, for five months, was to forestall this dynamic, and to bring a glimmer of economic coherence – and the potential for economic survival – to the Eurozone. It tried to get its “partners” to recognize that economic policies that had failed to produce predicted recovery for five years should be reconsidered and changed. For this heresy, Greece was crucified
3.5% in 2018, rigorous labour market and pension reforms, a more solid privatisation programme with “improved governance” (does that mean external ‘assistance’?)
Here’s the list:
Eurogroup draft on demands for Greek reformsdevelopments,” said Nikos Bistis, a veteran politician from the centre left. “Basically Syriza is now split in two.”
By late Sunday it had become clear Tsipras’ u-turn, accepting measures he had once furiously spurned, had produced a tectonic split with potentially far-reaching consequences. In addition to suffering an unexpected loss of support with 17 MPs breaking ranks at the weekend – defections that strip his government of a working majority – 15 other lawmakers also indicated that they would not approve the agreement in its entirety when it was brought to the 300-seat House.
The MPs, who included two ministers, said they were radically opposed to endorsing an austerity programme that was not only ideologically at odds with their own beliefs but would exacerbate “the country’s agonising and tragic social economic problems.”
The resistance raises the spectre of Tsipras being forced to call fresh elections – a move described as potentially catastrophic for the country.
“Greece can bend up to a point,” said Aristides Hatzis, a prominent political commentator. “But after that there is no bending, only breaking. The breaking point may well come when Tsipras realises he has lost most of his parliamentary group.”
The embattled prime minister will also face substantial resistance from the parliament’s speaker Zoe Konstantopoulou in getting the policies fast-tracked through the House.
A Syriza hardliner, Kostantopoulou said at the weekend:
“the government is being blackmailed. The lenders are insisting on turning the “no” [of last week’s referendum] into “yes.” I could never vote for the contents of the agreement.”
And it says that “The Eurogroup thus welcomes the additional following commitments of the Greek authorities on the basis of a clear timetable”:
fully comply with the medium-term primary surplus target of 3.5 percent of GDP by 2018, according to a yearly schedule to be agreed with the institutions;
- carry out ambitious pension reforms and specific policies to fully compensate for the fiscal impact of the Constitutional Court ruling on the 2012 pension reform and to implement the zero deficit clause;
- adopt more ambitious product market reforms with a clear timetable for implementation of all OECD toolkit I recommendations, including Sunday trade, sales periods, over-the-counter pharmaceutical products, pharmacy ownership, milk, bakeries. On the follow-up of the OECD toolkit II, manufacturing needs to be included in the prior action;
- on energy markets, the privatization of the electricity transmission network operator (ADMIE) must proceed, unless replacement measures can be found that have equivalent effect, as agreed by the institutions;
- on labor markets, undertake rigorous reviews of collective bargaining, industrial action and collective dismissals in line with the timetable and the approach suggested by the institutions. Any changes should be based on international and European best practices, and should not involve a return to past policy settings which are not compatible with the goals of promoting sustainable and inclusive growth;
- fully implement the relevant provisions of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, in particular to make the Fiscal Council fully operational;
- adopt the necessary steps to strengthen the financial sector, including decisive action on non-performing loans, transposition of BRRD and measures to strengthen governance of the HFSF and the banks;
- develop a significantly scaled up privatization program with improved governance. A working group with the institutions shall provide proposals for better implementation mechanisms;
- amend or compensate for legislation adopted during 2015 which have not been agreed with the institutions and run counter to the program commitments;
- implement the key remaining elements from the December 2014 state of play of the fifth review of the second economic adjustment program.”
This is all in addition to the original plan, so tricky for Athens to commit to and achieve.but this likeNOORTH
tive means of levying tax. “Only the restaurants and cafes are making money,” reckons Vassilis. “With 50 euros, people will buy food not clothes, and so [the government] doesn’t have any other way of making money.” ermany’s Wolfgang Schäuble’s caustic remarks on Greece so we now oficially enemies my two countries.s incredible, people are suddenly no longer afraid to spend. Everyone is hoping for a solution,” he told me.ha on ollut suomalaisten päasiallisin matkakohdeGreek officials have denied that Germany has suggested they clear off for five years, reports Euronews’s Efi Koutsokosta.Nika @nikanen 6 min6 minuuttia sitten
@987x1 Nyt ollaan päästetty tilanne niin pahaksi, että vaikea enää normalisoida sitä. @HellyLuv
Näytä keskustelu 0 uudelleentwiittausta 0 suosikkia
Vastaa Uudelleentwiittaa Suosikki
Nika @nikanen 1 t1 tunti sitten
Kurdijoukkojen tukeminen ei auta pelastamaan maailmaa ISISiltä @HellyLuv, melkeinpä päinvastoin. #ylea2
eser @987x1 29 min29 minuuttia sitten
@nikanen @HellyLuv ketä sitten tukea
n 18 min18 minuuttia sitten
@987x1 "Maltillisia" sunnimuslimiryhmittymiä, joita paikalliset voi pitää hyvänä vaihtoehtona IS:lle. >> @HellyLuv
0 uudelleentwiittaa Suosikki
Nika @nikanen 18 min18 minuuttia sitten
@987x1 Monet muslimit näkee kurdit + muut lännen kanssa veljeilevät islamin vastustajina & kurdit on myös "liian" nationalistisia. @HellyLuv
0 er @987x1 11 min11 minuuttia sitten
@nikanen @HellyLuv taisteluissa ei oikein välimuotoja, ISISin alue on valtava
Nika @nikanen 7 min7 minuuttia sitten
@987x1 Niin, totta. Ongelma ei olis näin laaja jos alueen historia olisi erilainen yms., mut turha kai jossitella. @HellyLuv
22.08 - 21. heinäkuuta 2015 · Tiedot
Kuka on tässä kuvassa?
Nika @nikanen 6 min6 minuuttia sitten
@987x1 Nyt ollaan päästetty tilanne niin pahaksi, että vaikea enää normalisoida sitä. @HellyLuv
@nikanen @HellyLuv saddamin aikana ei iollut ongelmia
linnoitus joka valitsee mitä haluaa oloi europi ehei plan B ektos apo ellada. niin heikkona hetkenä sitä seksistelFor Greece, the worst catastrophe now would be to stay in the eurozone
Simon Jenkins picture plein 40 45
A Grexit, with a managed default and devaluation to kickstart recovery, is the only deal that should be on the table
jenkins euro flag Ellie Foreman-Peck
Illustration by Ellie Foreman-Peck Photograph: Guardian
Wednesday 8 July 2015 18.47 BST Last modified on Wednesday 8 July 2015 18.57 BST
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There must be Grexit this weekend. It is light at the end of the tunnel, the best possible outcome from Greece’s agony and, in truth, the only one. The admission of Greece into the eurozone in 2001, tying its economy to that of Germany (and its reckless bankers), was a disaster waiting to happen. The error was so great that even this tiny economy – just 1.3% of the EU’s – has contrived to traumatise Europe’s leadership for the past three months. The only catastrophe now would be no Grexit.
Talk of Greek bankruptcy and its dropping the euro as “an abyss … a nightmare … chaos … unthinkable anarchy” is bankers’ drivel. It will be tough to handle – made vastly more so by being delayed, unplanned and enforced. But handled it must be. Greece is bankrupt. It cannot pay its debts, let alone any more forced on it by “bailout”. There must be a managed default and a restarting of the engine of recovery. That is the only “deal” that should be discussed this weekend.
Greek crisis: New bailout request filed; Tsipras clashes with MEPs - as it happened
European leaders told Greece it has five days to agree a reform plan, or face leaving the single currency
Sometimes the small voice of economics should rise above the shrieking hysterics of politics. The laws of bankruptcy were invented by the Victorians not to stick plaster over capitalism’s wounds. Insolvency and limited liability lay at the core of commercial enterprise. Borrower and lender alike had to accept risk for capitalism to thrive. Greece within the eurozone was allowed to borrow riskily and was lent to riskily. Any fool (except a eurofool) knew it would end in disaster.
The IMF last week admitted Greece’s debts were “unsustainable”. But such is the political arthritis now afflicting Europe’s “technocratic” rulers that they ignored the fact. They concentrate on their one concern: somehow extending Greece’s repayments so German, French and British banks could have even larger loans underpinned. It is bankers, not Greeks, who are being “bailed out”. They want Greek taxpayers to go on paying interest even if the principal is as beyond reach as a tsarist bond.
Denying an entire nation the benefit of bankruptcy imprisons its citizens. The most famous debtor in literature, Dickens’s William Dorrit, could never repay his creditors as long as they kept him in the Marshalsea jail. But they kept him there because it suited them, as it does Greece’s bankers, to have his debts on their books rather than admitted as unpayable.
Even if Greece were this weekend to win some debt relief, this would not set it on the road to recovery. Austerity has already impelled the Athens government to curb its madcap public sector. It has begun the “restructuring” that justified similar austerity in western countries (notably Britain) in the 1980s. It can now reasonably argue that austerity’s basic job is done. It is now running a primary budget surplus, spending less than it receives in taxes.
Austerity economics was always meant as a short, sharp shock, not a coherent economic policy. For Greece it has been about as productive as prisoners sewing mailbags. Growth has been stifled, demand suppressed and investment stalled. National output since 2008 has fallen by a quarter, unemploying 25% of its workforce. It is simply crazy. Greece cannot grow and cannot service future borrowings, let alone past ones. It is seeing Europe’s worst recession since the war – a deliberate, manmade recession.
The eurozone’s managers care more about their loans and their beloved currency than they do about Greece
Greece’s competitiveness is way out of kilter with the powerhouses of the northern eurozone. Even the EU’s more moderate flat-earthers argue that Greece’s debts should merely be rolled over while it “rebalances” to German levels of efficiency. It must stay shackled to an overvalued rate of exchange lest the great European cause suffer and ever closer union be tarnished. In this spirit a group of leftwing economists, including France’s Thomas Piketty, wrote to the Guardian on Wednesday, lauding the euro as “a beacon of hope, democracy and prosperity”. It is as if Keynes had never lived.
The idea that a floating currency within the EU is “anarchy” or “the abyss” is nonsense. Britain’s pound sterling has fluctuated by as much as 30% against the euro in the past 15 years, to the benefit of the country’s economy, and probably to Europe’s as a whole. Fluctuating currencies may be a nuisance, but they reflect the fact that nations are socio-political entities. They make different democratic choices and are subject to different market disciplines.
Greece could never have brought itself into line with Germany overnight. Athens was never going to be Hamburg. Its savings fled north along with its skilled labour. It was crippled by the 2004 Olympics and tried to borrow its way out of collapse. Like Britain for much of its recent history, it needed the shock-absorber of a flexible exchange rate.
Today Greece’s biggest export earner and job creator, tourism, would hugely benefit from a 30% devaluation of a “new drachma”. Devaluation would equally raise the cost of imports, but such market discipline is politically preferable to the discipline inflicted by technocrats at distant summits.
Devaluation can also lead to hyperinflation, but it has not done so in Britain or in other European economies outside the eurozone.
The reality is that the eurozone’s managers care more about their loans and their beloved currency than they do about Greece. They should have seen Greece’s budgetary indulgence as a looming catastrophe long ago. They should have admitted their error and negotiated an orderly Grexit. As it is, they have proved unfit rulers of their new Europe. They have harmed its prosperity and endangered its south-eastern flank.
Historical parallels are always dangerous. But the past month’s Brussels comings-and-comings, the bluffs and counter-bluffs, the deadlines missed and ultimatums spurned, recall the twists and turns of Europe in 1914. Today’s continental wars may not be bloodthirsty any more, but they display the same chauvinist intransigence. It is not Grexit that threatens Europe’s security, but blind resistance to it.
Had Greece slid out of the euro after the crash of 2008, it would now be on the road to recovery. Its debts would have devalued. It citizens would be in work. Investors would be investing. Tourists would be flowing in. Perhaps Italy and Spain might be wondering if they too could be better off with a sovereign currency, leaving a tighter deutschmark zone to the north. They would probably be right. But for the time being, the priority is Grexit.